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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic homicides include killing an intimate partner1 out of jealous
rage, and killing a batterer out of fear and despair. How the criminal law
treats these different kinds of domestic homicides continues to challenge
our sense of justice. In this Article, I first address the injustice that the
partial defense of provocation for domestic homicides currently presents. I
then discuss why eliminating or modifying the defense will continue to be
problematic so long as mandatory sentencing persists. I next turn to the
recent developments in Australian states, where experimentation in this
area continues. I describe and analyze Australia’s continuing debate over
how the criminal law should respond to different kinds of domestic
homicides. Finally, I examine the most recent sweeping change to
American criminal defense law: Stand Your Ground/Castle laws such as

 Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. Thanks to Colleen Knix and
Ian Molitor for their excellent research assistance.
1

Domestic homicides also frequently involve the killing of an intimate partner’s lover.
See infra notes 17-19, and accompanying text.
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Florida’s law.2 I suggest that American lawmakers should consider
enacting a modified version of a recent Australian provision by amending
the modern Castle laws to provide a presumption of self-defense for
domestic violence survivors who kill their batterers in their homes or
vehicles.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH PROVOCATION
Professor Aya Gruber provides the latest major U.S. academic
contribution to this area in her 2014 article, “A Provocative Defense.”3
There she (in her own words) “provocatively”4 argues that in the United
States this defense, in its current form, functions fairly for all forms of
domestic homicide. Gruber suggests further that I, and others who voice
dissatisfaction with American criminal law’s status quo on provocation, are
misguided. She charges that we are using “criminal punishment to express
an anti-masculinity” message5 while disregarding the negative impact that
changing or abolishing the provocation defense would have on young
minority men “accused of non-intimate homicides and facing murder
charges in one of the most punitive systems on earth.”6
I respectfully disagree with Professor Gruber’s claim that provocation
functions fairly and with her portrayal of many of the critics of the current
form of the provocation defense. Gruber describes such criticism in purely
gendered terms. She says that critics believe provocation “gives male
defendants a benefit they do not deserve (mitigation) and denies female
2. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2014).
3. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CAL. L. REV. 273, 273 (2015)

[hereinafter Gruber, Provocation] (citing to four of my publications as examples of
anti-male bias because I seek to distinguish between heat of passion killings and killing
one’s batterer. Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in
the United States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27
(2006) [hereinafter Forell, Gender Equality] (cited in Gruber, Provocation at 277 n.25,
293 n.142, 300 n.187, 310 n.253, 311 n.258, 313 n.272, 314 n.280, 315 n.284, 322
n.331); CAROLINE FORELL & DONNA MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000) [hereinafter FORELL, A LAW OF
HER OWN] (cited in Gruber, Provocation at 292 n.135, 296 n.166, 323 n.377); Caroline
Forell, The Meaning of Equality: Sexual Harassment, Stalking, and Provocation in
Canada, Australia, and the United States, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 151 (2005)
[hereinafter Forell, The Meaning of Equality] (cited in Gruber, Provocation at 297
n.169); Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
597 (2004) [hereinafter Forell, Homicide] (citied in Gruber, Provocation at 290 n.128,
291 n.129, 291 n.147, 295 n.155, 324 n.345)).
4. Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 273.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 312 (quoting Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims and Mercy, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV 129, 185 (2014)).
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defendants a better disposition (acquittal).”7 However, my criticism of
provocation, while highlighting the need for substantive equality by taking
women’s experiences into account,8 is based on the degree of culpability of
certain homicidal conduct regardless of gender. My concern is that the
parallel use of provocation for domestic killings out of jealous rage and
domestic killings out of fear of continuing physical violence is unfair and
immoral. The unfairness is exacerbated in jurisdictions that have enacted
the Model Penal Code’s more expansive and subjective Extreme Emotional
Disturbance (EED) defense.9
There is a gender chasm when it comes to committing domestic
homicide. Men commit many more domestic homicides than women 10 and
are much more likely than women to kill out of jealousy.11 Furthermore,
while most male homicide victims are not killed by intimates, most female
victims of homicide are killed by husbands, lovers, ex-husbands, or exlovers.12 Many of these men were batterers before they were killers.13 In
contrast, most of the women who commit domestic homicides are domestic
violence survivors.14
These gendered facts do not mean that it is anti-male to argue that some
homicides deserve to be treated as murders while others do not, even if, in
application, this means that more men than women who commit domestic
homicide will be found to be murderers.15 Instead, critics such as myself
7. Id. at 314.
8. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 29-30.
9. See id. at 30; see also Carolyn Ramsey, Criminal Law: Provoking Change:

Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
33, 83 (2010).
10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 2283556,
FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE (2009) (“Females made up 70% of victims killed by an
intimate partner in 2007, a proportion that has changed very little since 1993.”).
11. Donna Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 91 (1992); Margo J. Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in
Spouse Killings? On the Exceptional Sex Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United
States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206 (1992).
12. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner
Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 14, 18 (2003).
13. Many men who kill out of jealous rage are batterers whose past conduct makes
it likely that they are a continuing danger to society and need to be incarcerated. See
Coker, supra note 11, at 89; R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WHEN MEN
MURDER WOMEN 82 (2015).
14. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 23-31 (1987); Wilson & Daly, supra note 11,
at 206.
15. Furthermore, since men kill far more often than women, inevitably more men
than women will be found guilty of murder. See id.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

3

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
FORELL 10/6/2016 (DO NOT DELETE)

4

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

3/15/2017 8:11 AM

[Vol. 25:1

assert that different reasons for killing merit different legal responses.
Anyone who kills another out of possessiveness and anger, where the other
threatened no serious physical violence, should be guilty of the crime of
murder.16
There is another fairness problem with current provocation law as
applied in domestic homicide situations: collateral murders. Many men are
also victims of domestic homicide by jealous men.17 Often the person
killed out of jealousy and rage is not a female but instead is her male
romantic partner.18 In fact, the original categorical provocation exception
to murder was not available if a husband killed his wife but instead applied
to his killing her lover.19 Today such killings continue to be far too
common.20 They may not be included in statistics on domestic homicide,
but they result from the same inexcusable homicidal conduct that should be
treated as murder, not manslaughter.
Others and I21 continue to search for a more just way for American
criminal law to treat domestic killings. It is obvious what the law should
do. Killing because of jealousy and possessiveness should be treated as
murder regardless of the genders of the parties.22 In contrast, those who
16. The other set of provoked killings that should be murder are “gay panic”
killings where the reason for committing homicide is that the victim, who was of the
same sex as the killer, made non-violent sexual advances. This use of provocation has
been shockingly common in Australia. Of the seventy-five people who successfully
used provocation between 1990 and 2004 in New South Wales, eleven were “gay
panic” cases. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 29-30 (quoted in Gruber,
Provocative, supra note 3, at 313 n.272); KATE FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM,
GENDER AND THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 153 (2014)
[hereinafter, FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM]; see also Lindsay v. The Queen,
[2015] 255 C.L.R 272 (Austl.) (quashing a conviction for murder in a gay panic case).
Today only two states, South Australia and Queensland, retain the “gay panic” basis for
provocation.
17. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 28 (citing Jenny Morgan,
Critique and Comment, Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales
Are Told About Them, 21 MELB. U.L. REV. 237, 256 (1997)).
18. See id.
19. See R v Mawgridge (1707) 84 ER 1107, 1114-15 (“When a man is taken in
adultery with another man’s wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer or knock out
his brains, this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of man, and adultery is the
highest invasion of property.”).
20. See FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 27 (reporting that
three out of eighteen cases in New South Wales where a provocation defense was
successful involved a man killing his estranged wife’s lover); see also, DOBASH, supra,
note 13, at 254.
21. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 9.
22. Aya Gruber agrees: “I will fully accept the claim that sexist men who kill their
partners are culpable for murder.” Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 308.
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kill their batterers out of fear often should not be held criminally
responsible, and when they are held criminally responsible, they should
rarely be found guilty of murder. Such outcomes satisfy formal equality by
treating like conduct alike for men and women. Murder convictions for
jealous killers and acquittals for domestic violence survivors who kill out
of fear also satisfies substantive equality by condemning the mostly male
domestic homicides that are based on possessiveness and excusing the
mostly female domestic homicides that are based on fear of death or
serious injury.23 Empirical evidence indicates that such outcomes comport
with how social norms have been evolving24 and history shows that the
law’s sympathy for people who kill out of jealousy is an aberration that
developed in the early twentieth century and may no longer be the norm. 25
Our laws should reflect our values.
III. THE NEED FOR A PROVOCATION DEFENSE
In her article, Gruber defends retaining the current rules surrounding
provocation because we live in a system where criminal law already is too
punitive and brutal.26 Gruber’s criticism of America’s criminal justice
system is fair. Like her, I want American jurisdictions to end the current
un-nuanced and overly harsh treatment of convicted killers and, in
particular, to abandon draconian mandatory sentencing.27
In many U.S. jurisdictions, a successful provocation defense that results
in manslaughter carries a substantially shorter sentence than the
jurisdiction’s mandatory minimum sentence for murder28 that is often a life
sentence.29 This presents a dilemma for those of us who seek to reform
criminal law to ensure that domestic violence survivors who kill are treated
justly, while at the same time eliminating the jealous heat of passion basis
for a manslaughter verdict. Without the provocation defense those who kill
their batterers and those who kill out of jealous possessiveness both risk
lengthy murder sentences.30 Furthermore, as Gruber notes, without the
23. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 29-30.
24. See id. at 36, 68 (examining jury preference for manslaughter over murder for

domestic violence survivors who kill and jury preference for murder over manslaughter
for killing out of jealousy).
25. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 44.
26. See Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 325.
27. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 44.
28. This is also true of the extreme emotion disturbance (EED) defense enacted in
the minority of U.S. jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code. See id.
29. See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV.
1241 (2011).
30. See id. at 1289.
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provocation defense, other killers also face the overly punitive outcomes.31
People who kill their batterers are particularly deserving of a choice
other than acquittal or murder. Whether male or female, at a minimum,
they should be entitled to a partial defense and a shorter sentence, while
also avoiding being labeled “murderers.” Moreover, domestic violence
survivors who kill their batterers often should not be treated as criminally
culpable at all. However, unless self-defense is modified to more
accurately account for the impact of domestic violence on why people kill
their abusers, a partial defense for such killers may still be needed to
prevent the extreme injustice that can result when murder is the only
option.32 For domestic violence survivors who kill, provocation provides a
fallback. It is necessary because self-defense remains biased. The element
of imminence33 and the failure of assessments of reasonableness to comport
with an understanding of the dynamics of family violence create persistent
problems for people who kill their batterers out of fear. Thus, provocation
is currently an important option when a domestic violence survivor is
charged with homicide and may not meet a jurisdiction’s requirements for
proving self-defense.34
Mandatory sentencing and unenlightened self-defense laws continue to
make revising or abolishing provocation undesirable.35 Even those who
kill out of jealousy and rage or for other indefensible reasons, and who
therefore should be found guilty of murder, will not always deserve life
31. Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 312.
32. See Simon, supra note 29, at 1282-83, 1296.
33. In contrast, imminence is not an element of self-defense in any Australian

jurisdiction but a matter to be considered in determining whether the accused’s
defensive force was necessary. See Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316, 382
(Austl.); see also Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 662 (Austl.) But see
Elizabeth Sheehy et al., Defences to Homicide for Battered Women: A Comparative
Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 467, 47071 (2012) (“Furthermore, there have now been a series of cases involving battered
accused where the Australian courts have been sensitive to the need to look past the
question of imminent attack in deciding whether lethal defensive force was necessary
in such cases.”).
34. Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 30, 60 (citing Rebecca Bradfield, The
Treatment of Women Who Kill Their Male Partners Within the Australian Criminal
Justice System 104-08 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Tasmania) (on
file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
35. Current law in the Australian state of Victoria now has no mandatory
minimum sentence for murder, has abandoned the “imminence” requirement for selfdefense; has abolished provocation; and attempts to educate jurors about family
violence in domestic homicide cases. It will be interesting to see if this combination
results in acquittals of more domestic violence survivors who kill and convictions for
murder of men who kill out of jealousy. See discussion infra.
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sentences.36 As I noted in my 2006 Gender Equality article: “Until judges
are given greater discretion in sentencing, and the law and application of
self-defense is more understanding of battered women’s situations, current
provocation law, as applied, may be the best that it can be.”37
Mandatory sentencing has frozen the law of provocation in the United
States.38 It is therefore not surprising that the lack of mandatory minimums
in four out of six Australian states39 is a critical factor that has made
feasible their limiting or abolishing provocation and their experimentation
with alternatives.40
IV. AUSTRALIA’S REFORMS
Before discussing the potential for some domestic violence survivors
who kill to use the popular but controversial American Stand Your Ground/
Castle doctrine reforms, I examine Australian states’ most recent attempts
to provide justice for both sets of domestic homicides. Australia’s ongoing
struggle to find a satisfactory alternative to common law provocation
demonstrates that getting the treatment of domestic homicide right, without
unintended consequences, remains challenging and may require further
experimentation.
Australia is an ideal legal laboratory. The geographical size of the
United States, it has fewer than twenty-five million people living in its six

36. I agree with Aya Gruber on this point. See Gruber, Provocative, supra note 3,
at 312; see also Marc Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock Up Fewer People,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(May
23,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/how-to-lock-up-fewerpeople.html?
We could cut sentences for violent crimes by half in most instances without
significantly undermining deterrence or increasing the threat of repeat
offending. Studies have found that longer sentences do not have appreciably
greater deterrent effects; many serious crimes are committed by people under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, who are not necessarily thinking of the
consequences of their actions, and certainly are not affected by the difference
between a 15-year and a 30-year sentence. For the same conduct, the U.S.
imposes sentences on average twice as long as those the British impose, four
times longer than the Dutch, and five to 10 times longer than the French. One
of every nine people in prison in the United States is serving a life sentence.
37. Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 68.
38. Id. at 42.
39. New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia.
40. Mandatory minimums have explicity been given as the reason why South
Australia chose to retain common law provocation. See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW COMM.,
PARLIAMENT OF S. AUSTL., 53 PARLIAMENT, Rep. of the Legislative Review Committee
into the Partial Defence of Provocation 9 (Comm. Print 2014).
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states.41 The two states with the most people, Victoria and New South
Wales, have fewer than six and eight million people respectively. It is
therefore relatively easy to track all the domestic homicides in each state.
In addition, the practice in most Australian states of relying on law reform
commissions to guide the legislators in their law making is a helpful
feature.42 One of the law reform areas that most Australian states have
been actively engaged in for more than a decade is domestic homicide.43
During that time Australia has become a leader in experimenting with
alternatives to the traditional provocation doctrine.44
In every Australian state, lawmakers have recently confronted, and
responded to, the justice problems presented by the partial defense of
provocation;45 most have also modified their self-defense laws.46
Furthermore, unlike the Stand Your Ground/Castle doctrine reforms
enacted in the majority of American states,47 the impetus for Australian
states making changes in the criminal law affecting domestic homicides has
been distinctly feminist.48
In 2003, with almost no discussion, the small island state of Tasmania
became the first common law jurisdiction in the world to abolish
provocation.49 In 2005, after a thorough consideration of various
alternatives by the Victoria Law Reform Commission (VLRC), Victoria
followed Tasmania’s lead and abolished the provocation defense.50
However, Victoria also created a lesser offense of defensive homicide, 51
and amended its self-defense statute.52 The express reason for these
additional changes was to help assure that the abolition of provocation

41. The populations are approximately as follows: Queensland (4.8 million),
Tasmania (519,000), New South Wales (7.7 million), South Australia (1.7 million),
Western Australia (2.6 million), Victoria (6.1 million). AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, http://www.abs.gov.au (last visited January 16, 2017).
42. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 52-53.
43. Id. at 49-50.
44. Id. at 50.
45. See FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 91.
46. See id. at 93.
47. See Mary Ann Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your
Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1099, (2014) [hereinafter Franks, Real Men Advance]
48. See, e.g., Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 54 (examining Victoria’s
express purpose of helping battered women).
49. Id. at 56-58.
50. Id. at 57.
51. Id. at 55 n.154.
52. See id. at 56 n.159.
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would not mean that those who kill out of fear would be at greater risk of
being held guilty of murder.53 For the same reason, in 2009 Western
Australia abolished provocation, replacing it with excessive (imperfect)
self-defense.54 It is no coincidence that all three of these states allow
judicial discretion in sentencing. Neither murder nor manslaughter carries
a mandatory minimum sentence;55 this lack of mandatory minimums allows
judges to tailor sentences that fit the situation.56
Because of Tasmania’s small population, it experiences very few
homicides per year.57 Therefore, more time will be needed before it is
known whether Tasmania’s abolition of provocation, without making other
changes, has had its intended purposes of helping domestic violence
survivors while condemning those who kill out of jealousy.58 Similarly,
Western Australia has not had a sufficient number of homicides since 2009
(when it abolished provocation) to provide meaningful data. In contrast,
Victoria’s population is large enough that, since its 2005 reform, there have
53. See id. at 54.
54. See Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act Num. Acts No. 29 2008 (W. A.) s

12 (Austl.). The only other common law jurisdictions to abolish provocation are New
Zealand and, oddly enough, Texas. See also Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment
Act 2009, ss 1-5 (N.Z.); S.B. 1067, 73rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1994). Since 1994,
instead of heat of passion being a partial defense, Texas Penal Code § 19.02 expressly
allows provocation to be raised in sentencing and if the defendant proves it by the
preponderance of evidence, “the offense is a felony of the second degree.” But see TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2015). In reality, however, the level of sentencing if
heat of passion is found in the sentencing phase is the same as it was when it was a
partial defense to murder. Because of other aspects of Texas law, it was still possible
for a jealous husband who killed his wife and injured her new partner to receive only
four months in jail! CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 42-43 (2003)
(discussing the Watkins case).
55. Paige Darby et al., Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill
2014, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 8 (Parliamentary Libr. & Info. Serv. Dep’t. of Parliament
Serv., Vic, Austl.) July 2014, at 22-23 [hereinafter Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment
2014].
56. Concerns have been raised about the consideration of provocation in
sentencing as merely shifting victim blaming to another setting. See FITZ-GIBBON,
HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 252-54.
57. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 58 n.170; see also Darby,
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at Appendix B.
58. Today provocation may be considered as a form of mitigation in the
sentencing phase. See Tyne v Tas [2005] 15 Tas. R. 221, (Ct. of Criminal App.)
(Austl.) If provocation is at issue, the accused has the burden of proving mitigating
circumstances by the preponderance of evidence in the sentencing phase instead of the
prosecution having to prove no provocation beyond a reasonable doubt prior to
abolition of the defense in 2003. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra
note 55, at 19.
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been a substantial number of homicides where defensive homicide was
charged, including a few cases where women have killed their partners.59 I
therefore turn my focus to Victoria’s 2005 law, what the post-reform
reported cases have revealed, and the additional law reform that resulted in
2014.
A. Victoria
Like the partial defense of excessive self-defense/imperfect self-defense,
defensive homicide requires that killers subjectively but unreasonably
believe their actions are necessary to defend against death or “really serious
injury.”60 From November 2005 (when the offense of defensive homicide
first became available) through August 2013, it was successfully used
twenty-eight times, both at trial and through plea-bargaining.61 In a stark
example of unintended consequences, twenty-four of the twenty-eight
killers who pled to or were found guilty of defensive homicide were men;
only two of these cases involved intimates or former intimates.62 In
59. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at Appendix B.
60. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 3 (stating self-

defense is available when the killer meets two elements: (1) believes her actions are
necessary against the infliction of death or really serious injury, and (2) has reasonable
grounds for holding that belief). For a description on an American version of imperfect
self-defense, see People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1131 (Cal. 2013) (distinguishing
imperfect self-defense from provocation). This partial defense is available in a minority
of American jurisdictions. LEE, supra note 55 at 134-35 (2003).
Victoria chose to abolish provocation and enact defensive homicide as a
separate offense instead of reinstituting the partial defense of excessive self-defense
that VLRC had recommended that also would similarly have resulted in manslaughter
for killing out of unreasonable fear. Some commentators criticized this decision as
leading to unnecessary complexity and confusion. See Oliver Milman, Victoria Will
Scrap ‘Defensive Homicide’ and Offer Simpler Test for Self-Defence, THE GUARDIAN
(June 22, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/victoria-will-scrapdefensive-homicide-and-offer-simpler-test-for-self-defence; see also Kellie Toole,
Defensive Homicide on Trial in Victoria, 39 MONASH U. L. REV. 473, 479 (2013)
[hereinafter Toole, Defensive Homicide] (arguing that the separate offense limits
transparency in the plea bargaining process). But see Ramsey, supra note 9, at 76
(describing the difference between excessive self-defense and defensive homicide as
“mostly expressive.”),
61. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 28 (Appendix B:
Defensive Homicide Convictions).
62. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 28. One of the
domestic homicides committed by a man was the killing the new lover of his former
partner. R v Edwards [2008] Vict. Sup. Ct. 297 (Austl.). The other highly controversial
case is R v Middendorp, where a man killed his female domestic partner. R v
Middendorp [2010] Vict. Sup. Ct. 202. (Austl.). See infra note 72 and accompanying
text.
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contrast, of the four women guilty of defensive homicide, three killed an
intimate or former intimate.63 Thus, defensive homicide led to pleas of, or
convictions for, manslaughter (instead of acquittal or conviction for
murder) mainly for men who committed nondomestic homicides against
other men.64
There was public outcry because the main use of defensive homicide was
not by domestic violence survivors (the intended beneficiaries of the 2005
reform). News articles complained that habitually violent offenders had
hijacked the new offense;65 some academic commentators, most notably
Professor Kate Fitz-Gibbon,66 criticized it similarly.67 In 2014, Victoria’s
legislature abolished defensive homicide, less than ten years after this new
crime had been created.68 As a result, Victoria, like Tasmania, now has no
intermediate manslaughter option between acquittal and murder for
intimate homicides. Instead, again like Tasmania, judges can now consider
provoking conduct in the sentencing process after a conviction for murder
and have the discretion to impose the sentence they deem appropriate.69
The reasons defensive homicide was abolished in Victoria deserve
63. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 28.
64. Marie Virueda & Jason Payne, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, Homicide in

Australia: 2007-08 National Homicide Monitoring Program Annual Report 25 (2010)
(stating that men commit about eighty percent of homicides in Australia.).
65. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 8 n.35.
66. See, e.g., id., at 8 n.36-37; Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Abolishing Defensive Homicide
Will Benefit Female Victims and Offenders, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:33
PM)
http://theconversation.com/abolishing-defensive-homicide-will-benefit-femalevictims-and-offenders-18484.
67. See Kellie Toole, Self-Defense and the Reasonable Woman: Equality Before
the New Victorian Law, 36 MELB. U. L. REV. 250, 286 (2012) [hereinafter Toole,
Reasonable Woman].
68. The Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014
received Assent in September 2014. It took effect on November 2, 2014. VICTORIAN
LEGISLATION AND PARLIAMENTARY DOCUMENTS, http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au
(last visited February 15, 2016); see Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra
note 55.
69. Victorian judges use the “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing. See
SENTENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCE APPEALS IN VICTORIA, SUMMARY PAPER, 3
(Aug. 2012):
Under the ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach set out in Australian common law
and followed in Victoria, the sentencing judge must identify all the factors that
are relevant to the sentence, discuss the significance of each factor and then
make a decision as to the appropriate sentence given all the facts of the case.
Only at the end of this process does the judge determine the sentence. While
judges are encouraged to state the factors that they have taken into account in
determining the sentence, they are discouraged from quantifying the precise
weight given to any single factor.
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further scrutiny. One concern leading to abolition was the belief that the
players in the legal system were using it as a “catch-all” middle-ground
offense for the purpose of plea deals.70 As a result, in some cases the
defendant might never have even asserted facts meeting the elements of
defensive homicide but negotiated manslaughter in the process of pleabargaining. A few trial outcomes also indicated that defensive homicide
sometimes benefited male abusers the same way provocation had done
before the 2005 reforms.71 The most cited example of this was Luke
Middendorp who stabbed his petite female partner in the back and then
successfully asserted a claim of defensive homicide at trial.72 Similarly,
Kevin Roy Edwards pled guilty to defensive homicide after he killed his
female ex-partner’s new lover in a typical “jealous killing” scenario.73
These cases suggest that, in practice, the law’s treatment of male violence
retained at least some of the pre-reform status quo in Victoria.74
Another criticism of defensive homicide was that it relied on the premise
that many domestic violence survivors who kill out of fear do so
unreasonably; in reality, reasonable people might kill to protect themselves
if faced with repeated violence.75 Therefore, some claim that, like the use
of Battered Women’s Syndrome, domestic homicide tends to pathologize
battered women.76 Instead, critics argued that it is often society’s lack of
70. Kellie Toole believes that it is what began to happen. Toole, Defensive
Homicide, supra note 61, at 503; see also Asher Flynn & Kate Fitz-Gibbon,
Bargaining with Defensive Homicide, 35 MELB. L. REV. 905, 931 (2011).
71. Elissa Hunt, Defensive homicide law hijacked by career criminals, drug
addicts and drunks, HERALD SUN (Oct. 3, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/defensive-homicide-law-hijacked-bycareer-criminals-drug-addicts-and-drunks/newsstory/2e57a435cbc4559c5e52927f582f8e85.
72. Paul Anderson, Girlfriend killer Luke John Middendorp loses appeal bids,
HERALD
SUN
(Mar.
22,
2012,
4:30
AM),
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/archive/news/girlfriend-killer-luke-john-middendorploses-appeal-bids/news-story/8b8e33228329f6cf7472ecceb874ed96. For a detailed
description of this case, see FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 15, at
181-88.
73. Elissa Hunt, Man who kicked ex-partner’s new boyfriend to death jailed.
HERALD
SUN
(Aug.
12,
2008,
10:00
AM)
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/jail-for-kicking-murder/story-e6frf7kx1111117182718.
74. At least one “gay panic”/homosexual advance killing successfully pled
defensive homicide See Toole, Defensive Homicide, supra note 61, at 497-98.
75. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 35, 75-76.
76. See id. at 74; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 213, 216-17 (1992).
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understanding of the dynamics and dangers of domestic violence that make
it appear that the conduct was unreasonable when, in fact, it was reasonable
under the circumstances.77 As a result, defensive homicide was viewed as
failing to remedy poor judge and jury understanding of family violence.78
Commentator Kellie Toole closely examined the four domestic
homicides committed by women in Victoria during the period from 2005,
when defensive homicide became available, through 2012, two that were
not prosecuted and two that resulted in the women being found guilty of
defensive homicide.79 She concluded that these cases indicated that, even
for domestic violence survivors, defensive homicide was often not
achieving the legislature’s intended results.80
The first two domestic homicides Toole examined were not pursued to a
plea or conviction. “SB” killed her sexually abusive stepfather, making
this case an atypical “domestic homicide” because the deceased was not a
romantic partner but, instead, a parent. Although the charges initially
included defensive homicide, prosecutors chose not to pursue the case.81
Eighteen-year-old SB had been sexually abused by the deceased on a near
daily basis for years before she shot him.82 It is not surprising that
prosecutors believed that a jury would refuse to convict her of anything. A
few months later, Freda Dimitrovski killed her abusive husband with a
knife after he hit her in the face and then attacked their daughter.83 There
was ample evidence of long-term domestic violence.84 The trial court

77. See Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 286 (examining twenty-four
cases of defensive homicide between 2006 and 2012; eighteen offenders were men who
killed other men, two were women who killed men, and one, Luke Middendorp, was a
man who killed his female intimate partner); see also Darby, Victoria Crimes
Amendment 2014, supra note 55 (giving a later summary of the twenty-eight cases
through August 2013 where defensive homicide was used before it was repealed.).
78. FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 201-04.
79. Two more women were prosecuted for domestic homicides subsequent to
Toole’s article but before Victoria repealed this crime in 2014: Jemma Edwards who
pled to defensive homicide of her husband in 2012 and Angela Williams who was
convicted of defensive homicide of her husband in 2014. See R v. Edwards [2012]
VSC 138 (Victoria Supreme Court) (Austl); see also DPP. v Williams [2014] VSC 304
(Victoria Supreme Court) (Austl.).
80. Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 250.
81. See id. at 267-268; see also Michael Turtle, Charges Dropped against
Teenager Who Killed Her Stepfather, ABC LOCAL RADIO PM, (Mar. 27 2009, 6:26
PM), http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2528412.htm.
82. Michael Turtle, supra note 81.
83. Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 268.
84. Id. at 269.
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dismissed the charges, which included defensive homicide.85 In both of
these cases defensive homicide was unnecessary because the women were
able to show they acted in self-defense and therefore were legally
guiltless.86 For this reason, Toole argued that the existence of defensive
homicide was not important for them:
Neither immediacy nor proportionality were at issue in either of the
discontinued cases, and so neither is an example of a situation in which
87
an abused woman has traditionally been disadvantaged.

In contrast to Toole, Victoria’s Department of Justice concluded that the
outcomes for SB and Dimitrovski showed that enacting defensive homicide
provided a major improvement “to the criminal justice system in dealing
with situations in which a woman kills in response to long-term family
violence.”88
For the domestic homicides committed by Karen Black89 and Eileen
Creamer,90 defensive homicide was clearly relevant. However, Toole
argued that these cases demonstrated that the availability of this crime
created more problems than it solved.91 Black killed her male live-in
partner after both had been drinking and it became evident that he was
going to rape her, as he had done before.92 Black and her son provided
ample history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, control and threats.93
However, during those same accounts, Black said her partner “was never
physically violent towards [her],” and that she “could not justify what
happened.”94 Black’s conflicting testimony indicates that she may not have
been willing to accept that the violence done to her was, in fact, violence.
In the end, Black pleaded guilty to defensive homicide even though a jury
might have reasonably found complete self-defense.95 According to Toole,
the availability of defensive homicide proved problematic here because
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 270.
Id.
CRIMINAL LAW – JUSTICE STATEMENT, DEFENSIVE HOMICIDE: REVIEW OF THE
OFFENCE OF DEFENSIVE HOMICIDE: DISCUSSION PAPER 32-33 (VICTORIA DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 2010) (Austl.) [hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER].
89. See R v Black [2011] VSC 152, 3 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.); see also Darby,
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31.
90. See R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196, 1 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.); see also Darby,
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31.
91. Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 271.
92. Id. at 272.
93. Id. at 272-73.
94. Id. at 275.
95. Id. at 278.
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women like Black may plead to this crime even though they have a good
chance of succeeding on complete self-defense.96 Black received a
sentence of nine years in prison.97
Toole may be right in Black’s case, but it is often unclear that providing
an intermediate option is necessarily bad for women who may (or may not)
be able to prove complete self-defense. Whether to opt for a middle
ground between acquittal and murder is a difficult calculus to assess and
very fact specific. Furthermore, when there is sentencing discretion, as
exists in Victoria, pleading to defensive homicide in a case where the killer
is a domestic violence survivor and the victim was her abuser, may lead to
a short or suspended sentence without going through the trauma of a trial
where the outcome could be a murder conviction.98
In the fourth case discussed by Toole, Eileen Creamer killed her
estranged husband during a fight about their sexual relationship, and then
initially denied her involvement.99 The Creamers did not fit the usual
pattern of a domestic violence relationship even though there was evidence
that the deceased had previously hit Creamer.100 It lacked both the control
and isolation factors that might cause an abuse victim to see killing the
abuser as the only way out. Specifically, the deceased was preparing to
move away to remarry his first wife and Creamer had been living with
another partner.101 The Creamers’ open marriage and unconventional
sexual conduct made it difficult to predict how a judge or jury might view
Eileen Creamer. Thus, in Creamer’s case, if she really was in danger,
defensive homicide may have been a shield against harsh value judgments
of Creamer’s lifestyle.102 More problematic, however, defensive homicide
may have allowed a woman who killed out of jealousy to plead to
manslaughter even though murder was the more appropriate crime.103
96. Id. (discussing the tendency of domestic violence victims to self-blame, to
underestimate the danger of their situation, and to otherwise view their self-defense as
not reasonable).
97. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31.
98. It is not clear whether they would have done better without it from the very
few cases involving women who killed their intimates and were found guilty of
manslaughter based on defensive homicide. Their sentences were comparable to the
men who committed non-domestic homicides. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment
2014, supra note 55, at 28.
99. Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 279.
100. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31.
101. Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 279.
102. For example, a juror might mistake Creamer’s sexual habits for de facto
consent to abuse; it would be interesting to research this case from an evidentiary point
of view. See id.
103. Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 281 (discussing Creamer’s
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The Creamer and Black cases indicate that defensive homicide does not
necessarily serve its intended purpose even when domestic violence
survivors kill their intimates. These decisions thus provided some support
for those who sought to repeal defensive homicide. However, the impact
of defensive homicide for domestic violence survivors remains sufficiently
ambiguous. The concern about men getting away with murder was likely
the more persuasive reason for abandoning this short-lived experiment.
There was serious opposition to the abolition of defensive homicide.
Virtually all the domestic violence support services groups, the Law
Institute of Victoria, and a substantial number of prominent academics
opposed the repeal of defensive homicide.104 They noted the continuing
risk that the many women who might be found guilty of manslaughter
based on defensive homicide would be unable to make out a self-defense
claim.105 They used Angela Williams’ case as an example.106 Williams
killed her long-term partner, Kally, by hitting him in the back of the head
with a pick-ax numerous times after they had been in a fight.107 Evidence
clearly showed that Williams was a victim of repeated physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse during their twenty-three year relationship.108
Nevertheless, the jury rejected Williams’ claim of self-defense and
convicted her of defensive homicide; she was sentenced to eight years.109
The Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria (DVRCV) voiced their
concern that “[h]ad defensive homicide been abolished at the time of her
trial, Angela Williams may have been unjustly convicted of murder.”110
credibility at trial).
104. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 10-13; see
also Charlotte King, Lorana Bartels, Patricia Esteal & Anthony Hopkins, Did
Defensive Homicide in Victoria Provide a Safety Net for Battered Women Who Kill? A
Case Study Analysis, 42 MONASH U. L. REV. 138, 147 (2016); Nicola Wake, ‘His home
is his castle. And mine is a cage’: A New Partial Defence for Primary Victims Who
Kill, 66(2) N. IR. LEGAL Q. 151, 158 (2015).
105. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 11; Defensive
Homicide an Essential Safety Net, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RES. CTR. VICTORIA (DVRCV)
(June 23, 2014), http://www.dvrcv.org.au/knowledge-centre/our-blog/defensivehomicide-essential-safety-net-victims [hereinafter Defensive Homicide].
106. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 11; see also
DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304, 1 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.). See generally King, supra
note 104 (analyzing DPP v. Williams, [2014] VSC 304 (Vic. Sup. Ct.) (Austl) as a case
study).
107. DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304, 1 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.).
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. at 1, 7, 11.
110. The flip side is that without the option of defensive homicide, the jury may
have found her not guilty based on self-defense. See id.; see also King, supra note 104,
at 175.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss1/1

16

Forell: Domestic Homicides
FORELL 10/6/2016 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/15/2017 8:11 AM

DOMESTIC HOMICIDES

17

Despite the broad coalition of defenders who provided evidence that
some battered women likely benefited from having defensive homicide
available, Victoria’s legislature repealed it. It appears that the Victorian
legislature decided that the social cost of the frequent reliance on defensive
homicide by violent men, in much the same way they had previously used
provocation in both domestic and non-domestic violence cases, outweighed
the law’s possible benefit to a small number of women who killed their
abusers but were unable to prove they acted in self-defense.111 Instead,
Victoria’s lawmakers sought other means of assisting domestic violence
survivors who killed their batterers through revising evidentiary rules112
and providing better access to complete self-defense for people who kill out
of fear.113 The revised language in the self-defense statute made it more
subjective than the previous version.114 It is meant to be deferential to
domestic violence victims; the defendant’s belief about the threat only
needs to be reasonable “in the circumstances as the person perceives
them.”115
When Victoria’s legislature abolished defensive homicide, it also revised
evidence laws in an attempt to limit “victim blaming” at trial.116 Likewise,
the Jury Directions were amended to educate juries on the effects of
domestic violence, and encourage acquittal when the killer was a victim of
Critics of the repeal also were concerned that the availability of defensive
homicide was particularly beneficial to indigenous women who, due to discrimination,
poverty and distrust of the justice system, were less likely to have equal access to
justice. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 11; cf. Aya Gruber,
When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3222
(2015) (quoting Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 COLO. L. REV.
129, 185 (2014) (“[G]iven the demographics of murder defendants [in the US],]. ‘the
group most likely to be burdened by the elimination or limitation of the provocation
defense is young men of color accused of non-intimate homicides and facing murder
charges in one of the most punitive systems on earth.’”).
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 14.
114. The
statute
reads:
“322K
Self-defence
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if the person carries out the conduct constituting
the offence in self-defence. (2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if — (a) the
person believes that the conduct is necessary in self-defence; and (b) the conduct is a
reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them. (3) This
section only applies in the case of murder if the person believes that the conduct is
necessary to defend the person or another person from the infliction of death or really
serious injury.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added); see also Crimes Amendment (Abolition of
Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic) s 4 (Austl.) [hereinafter Crimes Amendment].
115. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 15.
116. Id. at 7.
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domestic violence.117 Equally important, Victoria’s self-defense statute
that codified the common law118 already did not require that the threat be
“imminent,” or that the response be “proportionate,” elements that have
often been problematic for victims of domestic violence.119 Supporters of
the repeal of defensive homicide, therefore, hope that domestic violence
survivors who kill their abusers out of fear will view the 2014 changes, in
addition to the lack of imminence or proportionality, sufficient to
justifiably make them more willing to assert complete self-defense, where
in the past they felt doing so was too risky.120
B. Reform in Other Australian Jurisdictions
The legislatures of the other three Australian states, New South Wales,
Queensland, and South Australia,121 while not abolishing provocation, have
each examined it in the past decade. Both New South Wales and
Queensland have modified common law provocation;122 only South
Australia has retained traditional common law provocation.123 All three
states’ criminal codes also include the partial defense of excessive selfdefense (imperfect self-defense) akin to defensive homicide.124
1. New South Wales
New South Wales, the Australian state with the largest population, has
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 2 (citing Zecevic v DPP (Vic) [1987] 162 CLR 645, 661 (Austl.)).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
South Australia’s examination of provocation has been focused on another
highly problematic use of provocation - gay panic cases – and it concluded that no
change was necessary. See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE, Report of the
Legislative Review Committee into the Partial Defence of Provocation 5 (PARLIAMENT
OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA) 2014 [hereinafter South Australia Report 2014]; see also FITZGIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 99.
122. FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 92-93.
123. The 2014 South Australia report concluded that changes to provocation were
unnecessary were based on the South Australia appellate decision in R v Linsday which
concluded that there no longer was a gay panic basis for provocation in South
Australia. See South Australia Report 2014, supra note 122, at 6 (citing R v Lindsay
[2014] SASCFC 56 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia reversed R v Lindsay in
2015. Nevertheless, as of the publication of this Article, the legislature in South
Australia has retained provocation in its traditional form. See Lindsay v The Queen
[2015] HCA 16 (Austl.); see also Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Dr. Kate Fitz-Gibbon Responds to
High Court’s Judgment in R v Lindsay, CRIMINOLOGY@DEAKIN: JUSTICE & HOMICIDE
LAW (May 7, 2015), https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/criminology/dr-kate-fitz-gibbonresponds-to-high-courts-judgment-in-r-v-lindsay.
124. See infra Table, page 21.
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no mandatory minimum sentence for murder.125 Its legislature has
considered abolishing provocation on multiple occasions.126 Nevertheless,
after exhaustive consideration of the pros and cons, New South Wales has
retained provocation with substantial restrictions.127 The partial defense, as
amended in 2014, is now called “extreme provocation.”128 This defense is
only available if “the conduct of the deceased is a serious indictable
offence (punishable by five years’ imprisonment or more).”129
Extreme provocation will rarely if ever be satisfied when a domestic
killing is committed out of jealousy since the homicide victim is unlikely to
have been engaged in “a serious indictable offense.”130 However, there will
often be situations where a battered woman kills her abuser that also does
not meet the requirements for extreme provocation. The New South Wales
legislature therefore also provided domestic violence survivors who kill
with the partial defense of excessive self-defense which is analogous to
defensive homicide when their fear is found to be unreasonable.131
Recently, a domestic violence survivor successfully argued this defense in
R v. Silva.132 Of course, others accused of murder can also argue excessive
self-defense. It remains to be seen whether the availability of excessive
self-defense will result in a repeat of the experience in Victoria, where most
of the killers claiming unreasonable fear were not battered women but men
committing nondomestic homicides and, if so, how New South Wales will
respond.133
125. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 41; see also Darby, Victoria
Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 22-23 (stating the population of New South
Wales is 7.6 million people).
126. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 22-23.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 23.
129. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 3, s 23 (Austl.). In addition, it is now the objective
test for the loss of self-control by an “ordinary person,” as opposed to the previous
subjective test of “an ordinary person in the position of the accused.” See CRIM. TRIAL
CTS.
BENCH
BOOK:
DEFENCES
[6-444]
(2016)
(Austl.)
https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html; see also R
v Turnbull [No. 25] (2016) NSWSC 831 at 80, 91 (Austl.).
130. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 23.
131. Id. at 22-23.
132. See [2015] NSW 148 (Austl.); see also King, supra note 104, at 174. Silva was
sentenced to only a two-year suspended sentence, which suggests that the trial judge
believed she came close to proving complete self-defense.
133. King, supra note 104. More research is needed concerning the effectiveness of
this partial defense. The states that have excessive self-defense introduced it by statute
within the last 15 years. It is not clear whether men committing non-domestic
homicides have been using the defense frequently as occurred in Victoria, when the
analogous crime of defensive homicide was instituted.
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2. Queensland
Taking yet a different approach, in 2009, Queensland, in addition to
restricting its provocation defense,134 also introduced a new partial defense
explicitly for victims of domestic violence. It provides:
Killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship[:]
(1) A person who unlawfully kills another (the deceased) under
circumstances that, but for the provisions of this section, would
constitute murder, is guilty of manslaughter only, if—
(a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence
against the person in the course of an abusive domestic relationship; and
(b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s
preservation from death or grievous bodily harm to do the act or make
the omission that causes the death; and
(c) the person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to
the abusive domestic relationship and all the circumstances of the
135
case.

There was concern that this specific defense might lead to pleas or
convictions for manslaughter when acquittal was more appropriate, which
was worrisome since murder has a mandatory life sentence in
Queensland.136 However, notwithstanding the availability of the new
partial defense, at least two juries acquitted women who killed their
abusers, suggesting that “Killing for Preservation” may not hinder access to
complete self-defense.137
“Killing for Preservation” may be a model for jurisdictions seeking to
provide substantive equality for domestic violence victims who kill abusers
where, like many U.S. jurisdictions, there is a mandatory life sentence for
murder. This novel partial defense may allow manslaughter where a
complete defense is unlikely, but still neither discourage seeking an
acquittal based on complete self-defense in deserving cases, nor protect
unmeritorious defendants by casting too wide a net as Victoria concluded
regarding defensive homicide.138
134. Two restrictions were placed on provocation claims: words alone will not
suffice and provocation is not available when the killing was because a domestic
partner sought to end the relationship. Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1, s 304(2), s
304(3) (Austl.).
135. See id. at s 304B; id. (providing definitions for each element); see also Darby,
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 21 (citing Criminal Code (Abusive
Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) s 3
(Austl.), https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2010/10AC001.pdf).
136. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 20-21.
137. Sheehy, supra note 33, at 479 (criticizing partial defenses for killers who are
domestic violence victims).
138. FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 98.
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One change to Queensland’s partial defense should be made. Unless
self-defense no longer requires imminence and the experiences of battered
women are factored into what is reasonable, the requirement in (c) that “the
person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive
domestic relationship and all the circumstances of the case” is too
demanding.139 Victims of serious domestic violence who kill their batterers
out of actual fear should not have to prove that their fear was reasonable in
order to have murder reduced to manslaughter.
COMPARISON OF RELEVANT LAWS IN AUSTRALIAN STATES
Australia
New South
Wales

Queensland

South
Australia

Tasmania

Victoria

Western
Australia

No mandatory

Mandatory life
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sentence
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life for
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sentence
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SD: no
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imminence

imminence

imminence

imminence but

case law

but case law

imminence

case law

suggests it is

suggests it is

but case

suggests it is

not required

not required

on

law

not required

suggests it
is not
required

Provocation

Provocation

Common law

Provocation

Provocation

Provocation

restricted:

restricted:

provocation

abolished

abolished in

abolished

“extreme”

excludes

unchanged

2003; may be

2005; may be

2008

provocation

“jealousy

considered

considered

killings,” words

during

during

not enough;

sentencing

sentencing

burden of proof
on defendant.

Excessive

Partial defense

Excessive

No partial

No partial

Excessive

(imperfect) SD

“killing for

(imperfect)

defenses

defenses

(imperfect)

preservation in

SD

SD

an abusive
relationship”

139. See Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1, s 304(2) (Austl.).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

21

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
FORELL 10/6/2016 (DO NOT DELETE)

22

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

3/15/2017 8:11 AM

[Vol. 25:1

V. ASSESSING FLORIDA’S CASTLE LAW AS A PARTIAL SOLUTION FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS WHO KILL
I now turn from Australia’s enlightened experimentation with partial
defenses and reforming self-defense with its explicit intent to both benefit
domestic violence survivors who kill and punish killings out of jealous
possessiveness. My final focus is on the more vengeful and distinctly male
“castle” laws in a legal regime where mandatory minimum sentencing for
murder is the norm.140 Castle laws are not designed to remedy problems
with the law of domestic homicide; however, they provide a strong basis
for self-defense for the rare domestic violence survivor who kills her
former intimate when he attempts to invade her home or vehicle, and even
explicitly do so if there is a protective order in place.141 An opportunity
exists to do more to provide substantive equality for those who kill out of
fear. I suggest modifying Queensland’s partial defense specifically
designed for battered women (described earlier) to turn it into an additional
basis for presuming a killing in the home was justifiable self-defense under
Florida’s castle doctrine. But first, I examine how most U.S. jurisdictions
view “no duty to retreat,” Stand Your Ground, and the castle doctrine.
In this area, American criminal law is unique. The United States is
culturally and legally very different from other common law countries in
how it views and treats the duty, or lack of duty, to retreat when confronted
with deadly violence. Unlike everywhere else in the common law world,
the majority rule in the United States, even prior to the recent law reform,
has been that there is no duty to retreat in any place one is legally entitled
to be. Stand Your Ground is nothing new for America.
In contrast, other common law countries, including Australia, impose a
duty to retreat unless there is necessity based on self-defense except in
castle cases of home invasion.142 Thus, the rule everywhere, except the
United States, is that only in your home may you stand your ground and not
retreat even if it is safe to do so. Furthermore, recent U.S. reforms to the
universally recognized “no duty to retreat in your castle” law, that expand
this to occupied vehicles and create a presumption of self-defense, have
had no traction in other countries. In fact, to others, America’s Stand Your
Ground law and castle doctrine reform is viewed as very troubling and
140. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 25 (5th ed. 2009); James
Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on
Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 360-61 (2009).
141. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2) (2014).
142. See Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1, s 272(1)-(2) (Austl.); see also
Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403 n.5 (2010) [hereinafter, Forell, What’s
Reasonable?].
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bizarre.143 Nevertheless, since these changes in the castle doctrine have
been made in most American states, these laws should at least be modified
to benefit some domestic violence survivors who kill in their homes.
Otherwise, these women will have to prove self-defense, most likely by
claiming they are suffering from Battered Women’s Syndrome, thereby
pathologizing themselves.144
By 2014, at least thirty three states had enacted castle doctrine reform,
modeled on Florida’s 2005 statute.145 Three main changes to traditional
castle doctrine are now in effect in most American jurisdictions. First, the
places covered have been expanded, most notably to include any kind of
occupied vehicle.146 Second, if one is entitled to self-defense, one is also
immune from criminal prosecution and civil liability.147 Finally, and most
importantly, there is a presumption that killing an intruder entering one’s
occupied home or vehicle is self-defense.148 In contrast, this presumption
does not apply when the person killed was entitled to be in the home or
vehicle.149 This means domestic violence survivors who kill their batterers
at home or in a car will usually be denied the reformed castle doctrine’s
presumption of self-defense. An example of this is Callie Eudora Adams’
case where she shot her husband, Rodney Adams, while they were both in
their car.150 Ms. Adams claimed that she had been repeatedly battered
during her marriage and responded with deadly force when her husband
choked her and hit her in the back of the head, saying he would kill himself
and her.151 Her Stand Your Ground claim was rejected in an immunity
143. See Kumuda Simpson, ‘Stand Your Ground’: America’s Violent Culture
Written into Law, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 5, 2014 10:03 PM)
http://theconversation.com/stand-your-ground-americas-violent-culture-written-intolaw-22776. Of course, many legal commentators find this reform to be deeply
problematic too. See e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand
Your Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 858 (2013).
144. Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 47, at 1122.
145. Mary Anne Franks, How Stand Your Ground Laws Hijacked Self-Defense, in 3
GUNS AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF FIREARMS AND
FIREARM POLICY 141, 141 (Glenn H. Utter ed., 2015) [hereinafter Franks, Stand Your
Ground].
146. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a).
147. Id. § 776.032(1).
148. Id. § 776.013(1)(a).
149. Id. § 776.013(3).
150. Larry Hannan, Stand Your Ground Denied to Jackson Woman Who Killed
Husband,
FLORIDA
TIMES
UNION
(June
13,
2014,
3:47
PM),
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-06-13/story/stand-your-ground-deniedjacksonville-woman-who-killed-husband.
151. Id.
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hearing and she was charged with second-degree murder.152
No
presumption that she acted in self-defense was available to her because,
instead of being attacked by a stranger, she was attacked by her husband
who had a right to be in the car.153
The brainchild of the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC),154 these Stand Your
Ground reforms were misleadingly touted as woman-friendly.155 In reality,
they are of little or no assistance in the most common situations where
women actually are at risk.156 Marion Hammer, the first woman president
of the NRA and main proponent of the Florida castle doctrine reform, fully
recognized that the new castle presumption that killing is justifiable when
one kills an intruder is not available to domestic violence survivors who
kill their batterers unless the batterers are also unlawful intruders. 157
Instead, domestic violence survivors who kill have to prove they acted in
self-defense.158 According to Hammer when promoting the NRA’s castle
reform in Florida in 2005:
The way the law is written, when it comes to domestic violence
situations there is some prevailing law that is still in place but the law
attempts to say that if in a domestic violence situation you are being
beaten you may use self-defense, but you can’t simply take action
against an estranged spouse who breaks into the home if they own the
home. You have to be under attack before you use force in those
situations.
There was an effort by some of the attorneys on the Justice Committee to
try to be sure that in restoring your self-defense rights and your right to
protect your home that they did not set up scenarios where people could
159
murder people they did not like and claim it was lawful self-defense.

In order to understand the impact of the new castle laws, it is useful to
take a closer look at Florida’s law that has been the model for other

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. John Nichols, How ALEC Took Florida’s ‘License to Kill’ National, THE

NATION (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-alec-took-floridaslicense-kill-law-national.
155. Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 47, at 1101.
156. Id.
157. Former NRA President Exposes the Lies and Misinformation Aimed at
Florida’s ‘Castle Doctrine’ Law, CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (Nov. 3, 2005),
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/in_our_opinion/marion-hammer-nrainterview.htm.
158. FLA. STAT. § 776.031(2) (2014).
159. CTR FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, supra note 158.
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states.160 First, Florida’s self-defense law permits deadly force under
section 776.012(2) without the necessity of retreating even if retreat is
reasonable and safe. This is quite representative of the law of self-defense
in the United States.161
Florida law states:
A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or
she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or
herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
felony. A person who uses or threatens deadly force in accordance with
this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has a right to stand his
or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is
not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a
162
right to be.

Like self-defense throughout the United States, Florida’s self-defense
law is male-focused.163 Unlike some of the more recent Australian selfdefense laws,164 it is not designed to benefit battered women. The common
barriers to complete self-defense for battered women remain under this
typical test: the requirements of “imminence” and the difficulty in
establishing that her belief is “reasonable” because most decision makers
involved are unfamiliar with the dynamics of domestic violence.165
Turning from ordinary self-defense to killings in the home, Florida’s
modified castle law presumes a killing was in self-defense under certain
circumstances that focus on the traditional basis for the universal “no duty
to retreat” rule when the killing occurs in the home: i.e., a reasonable belief
(whether or not correct)166 that an intruder is trying to break in. While
home invasion historically focused on a man defending his family, home,
and self from other men attempting forcibly to enter his private domain,167
some women may benefit since it justifies their killing intruders as well.
Thus, formal equality that has made the historically male castle defense
160.
161.
162.
163.

See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012-.032 (2014).
See, e.g.,OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209 (2015).
FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
See id. § 776.013(3) (offering no presumption of self-defense if the person
killed was entitled to be in the home or vehicle, favoring the abuser).
164. For example, Victoria and other Australian states have removed the
“imminence” requirement and created evidentiary rules and jury instructions with
battered women in mind.
165. See FLA. STAT. § 776.031(2) (2014).
166. See Forell, What’s Reasonable?, supra note 143, at 409-13, 1428-32
(describing men’s mistaken but justified defense of home and family).
167. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237, 252 (2008).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

25

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
FORELL 10/6/2016 (DO NOT DELETE)

26

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

3/15/2017 8:11 AM

[Vol. 25:1

gender-neutral helps women who kill men breaking into their home or their
vehicle.
The presumption set out in section 776.013(1) reads as follows:
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent
peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when
using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great
bodily harm to another if:
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and
forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and
(b) The person who uses or threatens to use defensive force knew or had
reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry . . . was occurring or
168
had occurred.

The statute, however, also expressly states in 776.013(2) that the
presumption is not available when:
The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be
in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an
owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection
from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no
169
contact against that person . . .

This exclusion from the presumption covers situations when a domestic
violence survivor kills a live-in intimate; it clearly has domestic violence in
mind. Thus, domestic violence survivors who kill their violent husbands
and boyfriends will usually have to raise the claim of self-defense, even if
the killing is in the course of an attack by the deceased in the woman’s
castle.
In order to achieve substantive equality, people who kill their batterers
should be treated more sympathetically than they are now. Instead, the
2005 castle doctrine reform created an ambiguity about whether domestic
violence survivors who killed someone who was lawfully present in the
home even had the right to stand their ground!170 The statute’s language
providing a presumption of self-defense for killing intruders, combined
with the language denying the presumption if the person killed had some
form of property right to be there, except if there was a protective order
against them, implied that perhaps a battered woman was required to retreat
if she could do so safely before she would be justified in using deadly
force.171 In contrast, before the statute was enacted, the Florida Supreme
Court had expressly held that under the then existing law, battered women
168.
169.
170.
171.

FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
Id. § 776.013(2).
Id. § 776.013(3).
Id. § 776.013(1)-(3).
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in such a situation did not have to retreat even if the person attacking them
had a right to be in the home.172
Fortunately, in 2014 the Florida Legislature cleared up this ambiguity by
amending section 776.013(3) so that it now says: “[A] person who is
attacked in his or her dwelling, residence, or vehicle has no duty to retreat
and has the right to stand his or her ground and use or threaten to use force,
including deadly force” in accordance with Florida’s statutory test for selfdefense.173 With this clarification, Florida’s reform provides a domestic
violence survivor who kills a live-in batterer some potential to avoid
prosecution. If she asserts self-defense and if (this is a big if) her claim is
found to be credible by someone in authority, she may have the benefit of
the immunity provided by section 776.032:
Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use or
threatened use of force[:]
(1) A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s.
776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is
immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or
threatened use of such force by the person . . . against whom the force
was used or threatened. . . As used in this subsection, the term “criminal
prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or
174
prosecuting the defendant.

This immunity applies if a police officer chooses not to arrest the killer
or, if she is arrested, the District Attorney decides not to prosecute.175
Furthermore, even if arrest and prosecution ensue, the Florida Supreme
Court has held that a person claiming self-defense can now demand a
hearing in which, based on the preponderance of evidence, she can try to
prove she was entitled to immunity.176 This immunity can mean the
difference between freedom and life in prison, and domestic violence
172. Weiand v. State 732 So.2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (overruling State v. Bobbit,
415 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1982)).
173. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2014). The revisions to Florida’s 2005 Stand Your
Ground/castle doctrine reforms came in response to the highly publicized case of
Marissa Alexander. After being physically threatened, she fired a warning shot at her
abusive husband in front of his two children. She was initially sentenced to 20 years in
prison in 2012, but her conviction was overturned. She faced another trial with a
possible penalty of sixty years before she agreed to a plea deal in November 2014. In
support of the 2014 amendments, Marion Hammer said: “That’s abuse, that’s wrong,
that’s what this bill is designed to stop.” Alexander was released from a Jacksonville
jail in January 2015 under a plea deal of three years time served. See Franks, Real Men
Advance, supra note 47, at 1118-19; Matt Galka, Warning Shot Bill Passes Legislature,
CAPITOL NEWS SERVICE (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.flanews.com/?p=21239.
174. FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014) (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010).
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survivors who kill can have immunity too if they can convince someone
with authority that they acted in self-defense. But that’s the rub.177
The continuing difficulty for many domestic violence survivors who kill
to prove self-defense, when that is what justice calls for, makes it important
that the law find ways to help some of them make their case. For those
who kill their batterers at a time of non-confrontation, the lack of
imminence will make a successful claim of self-defense very difficult.178
For those who kill their batterers during a confrontation, something less
controversial than eliminating the imminence requirement, but more
empowering and self-respecting that showing she suffered from Battered
Women’s Syndrome, should be considered. I therefore propose that in
Florida and other reformed castle doctrine states, Queensland’s partial
defense for domestic violence survivors who kill179 be modified. This
would create a presumption that the killing was in self-defense when a
survivor kills her batterer and the following is proved:
(a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against
the person in the course of an abusive domestic relationship; and
(b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s or another’s
preservation from imminent death or grievous bodily harm to do the act
or make the omission that causes the death.

Thus, section 776.013 would be amended to add another basis for a
presumption that the killing was justified, in addition to the existing one for
killing an intruder.180 Most people who kill women are men the women
know, not strangers.181 Enacting this additional presumption would show
that the all too common threats and attacks by intimates are taken just as
seriously as the far rarer threats and attacks from strangers182 and that
177. See Hannan, supra note 151.
178. See FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2014).
179. Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1 s 304B (Austl.); see supra note 136, and

accompanying text.
180. See Hannan, supra note 151 and accompanying text. If this presumption had
been in effect when Eudora Adams shot her husband in their car, she would have been
presumed to have acted in self-defense.
181. When Men Murder Women, VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., (Sept. 2014),
http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2014.pdf (“The U.S. Department of Justice has
found that women are far more likely to be the victims of violent crimes committed by
intimate partners than men, especially when a weapon is involved. Moreover, women
are much more likely to be victimized at home than in any other place.”).
182. See The Truth About Guns and Self-Defense, THE WEEK (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://theweek.com/articles/585837/truth-about-guns-selfdefense (“[T]he annual per
capita risk of death during a home invasion [has been estimated] at 0.000002 percent –
essentially zero.”); see also Stephanie Zvan, How Well Does Your Gun Protect You?
ALMOST
DIAMONDS
(June
21,
2010),
http://almostdiamonds.blogspot.com/2010/06/how-well-does-your-gun-protect-
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domestic violence is real violence. Substantive equality would be served
by providing women with the right to defend their homes, their castles,
from those most likely to do them harm.
VI. CONCLUSION
Domestic homicides cover both killing out of jealous possessiveness and
domestic violence survivors who kill out of fear and despair. Australia
continues to experiment with ways to provide real justice for both kinds of
killings through the abolition or modification of the provocation defense;
providing partial defenses that are intended for domestic violence survivors
who kill; and making self-defense more hospitable to domestic violence
survivors who kill. Much of this has been possible because many
Australian states do not have mandatory minimum sentencing.183
Until mandatory minimums are abolished in the United States, the
provocation defense is likely to survive in its current form in order to
provide imperfect justice for both groups of domestic killers as well as nondomestic killers.184 However, more can be done for domestic violence
survivors when they kill their batterers to give them a fair chance at
proving justifiable homicide and thereby provide them with a more perfect
form of justice. In the majority of states that have enacted statutes like
Florida’s 2005 Stand Your Ground/castle doctrine reform, a simple way to
provide domestic violence survivors who kill with substantive equality is to
create a presumption that the killing was justified. Enacting a presumption
like the one I propose would show that those who support these statutes
also support gender equality.

you.html). Sadly, the person killed as an intruder may not be one. See e.g.,Patrick
Brennan et al., Police Investigate Death of Teen Shot by Dad, CINCINATTI.COM (last
updated
Jan.
13,
2016,
5:42
AM),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2016/01/12/police-teen-mistaken-intrudershot/78672506/.
183. Any states in the U.S. that don’t have mandatory minimums should follow
Australia’s lead and make self-defense more available to domestic violence survivors
who kill, and eliminate provocation for people who kill out of jealousy and rage.
184. See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 30 and accompanying text
(stating that while the provocation defense may still be necessary, the Model Penal
Code’s more subjective defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance should be
eliminated.).
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